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Central banks around the world have a reputation for being secretive about their
operations and market assessments. It is sometimes argued that central banks need
flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. We find that this explanation does
not carry through in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework, where trans-
15 parency about the central bank’s forecasting procedures improves output stabilization.
We also show that higher transparency increases optimal conservatism, as the benefits
from higher transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conser-
vative is the central bank.
JEL classifications: D83, E52, E58.
20
1. Introduction
Monetary policy makers broadly agree that communication is a very important part
of their business. Communication gives central bankers a tool to shape private sector
expectations, which are crucial for effective monetary policy. Blinder (1998) argues
25 that openness and communication with the public improve the effectiveness of
monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilizer because ‘central banks generally
control only the overnight interest rate, an interest rate that is relevant to virtually
no economically interesting transactions. Monetary policy has important macroeco-
nomic effects only to the extent that it moves financial market prices that really
30 matter like long-term interest rates, stock market values, and exchange rates’.
Most theoretical studies of central bank transparency assume some form
of informational asymmetry between the central bank and the private sector.
In particular, the central bank has an informational advantage about its own
goals (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Jensen, 2000; Eijffinger et al., 2000;
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Faust and Svensson, 2001; Geraats, 2005) or the state of the economy (e.g., Jensen,
2000; Cukierman, 2001; Morris and Shin, 2002; Gersbach, 2003; Geraats, 2005).
In all these studies, it is assumed that monetary authorities can observe and
respond directly to private sector expectations. While it is unquestionable that
5 central banks can hide their true intentions, and there is some evidence that they
have superior information about the economy (see for e.g. Romer and Romer,
2000), we think it is unrealistic to presume that policy makers have precise know-
ledge of market expectations. A more realistic setting, in the spirit of Tarkka and
Mayes (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003), among others, has to assume
10 that the central bank’s assessment of private sector expectations is imperfect.
1
Tarkka and Mayes (1999) have incorporated this assumption in a model that
features Lucas-type transmission mechanism while Evans and Honkapohja
(2003) analyse imperfect observability of private sector expectations in the context
of simple monetary policy rules under adaptive learning. Evans and Honkapohja
15 (2003) point out that although survey data on private forecasts of future inflation
and output are available to central banks, there are apparent concerns about the
accuracy of this data.
This paper studies a case where the information is asymmetric in two ways. First,
the private sector has superior knowledge about its own expectations of future
20 inflation and output. The central bank sets its policy based on an imperfect assess-
ment of these private sector expectations. Likewise the private sector cannot per-
fectly observe these assessments made by the central bank unless the central bank
publishes them. If it wishes, the central bank can provide information about the way
its assessment is produced and thereby make it easier for the public to infer the
25 judgment errors made by the central bank (see Tarkka and Mayes, 1999).
Our aim is to shed light on the implications of communication by the central
bank regarding its assessments on private sector expectations and macroeconomic
outcomes. We abstract from other sources of private information, such as unob-
servable central bank goals.
2 Moreover, unlike Morris and Shin (2002) and Wong
30 (2007), in our paper the central bank is not directly tracking an exogenous fun-
damental variable. Instead, the central bank simply monitors private sector expec-
tations and reacts to its noisy measure.
It should be borne in mind that the aim of central bank communication is to
reduce uncertainty on the part of the private sector, since these errors are also
35 reflected in the setting of interest rate policy. The presumption is that even if the
variance of the assessment error is exogenously fixed, communication of these
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1See also Bowles et al. (2007).
2See for e.g., Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) for a discussion of different forms of transparency. They
identify five broad categories of transparency: political (formal objectives, quantitative targets, and
institutional arrangements), economic (data, models and internal forecasts used for policy decisions),
procedural (strategy, minutes and voting records, capturing how policy decisions are made), policy
(prompt announcement and explanation of policy actions, and policy inclination), and operational
(control errors, transmission disturbances, and formal evaluation of policy outcomes).
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errors to the public can change public expectations such that under certain con-
ditions overall stabilization is improved.
3
We look at the effect of communication about assessments errors on the macro-
economic variables, namely, the variability in the rate of inflation and the output
5 gap. The main result of our analysis is that communication of these errors lowers the
variability of output but increases the variability of inflation, leading to a tradeoff.
This tradeoff also has normative implications for policy. As will be shown later,
a central bank who is sufficiently conservative (in the sense of Rogoff, 1985)
improves society’s welfare by communicating its assessment of market expectations
10 of inflation and output.
2. The model
We use a standard forward-looking New Keynesian model. A detailed treatment of
this model can be found in several recent papers that address monetary policy,
including Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000). The two basic structural relation-
15 ships, the Phillips curve and the expectational IS curve, are a log-linear approxi-
mation to a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model where aggregate
behavior is a result of explicit optimization by households and firms. There is
monopolistic competition in the product market and firms face nominal price
rigidity, thus giving monetary policy the ability to influence economic activities in
20 the short run.
Inflation is determined by a forward-looking Phillips equation
 t ¼  E
p
t tþ1 þ  xt þ ut ð1Þ
where p is the inflation rate, x is the output gap, and u   Nð0; 2
uÞ reflects a cost-
push shock to inflation, which is identically and independently distributed (in short
25 i.i.d.). The parameter   captures the discount factor while   is related to the average
frequency of price changes and the elasticity of product demand. These parameters
satisfy 0< <1 and  >0. The superscript p in E
p
t tþ1 stands for private sector
expectations. Thus current period inflation depends on private sector expectations
of future inflation, current period output gap and the cost-push shock. The equa-
30 tion for inflation is derived from firms’ pricing decisions, assuming that not all
firms can change their prices in any given period.
The output gap is governed by a forward-looking IS equation, which is a log-
linearized Euler equation associated with households’ intertemporal consumption
and saving decisions. It is given by
xt ¼ E
p
txtþ1    rt þ vt ð2Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3Expectation formation is the result of a complicated process and involves constantly changing judg-
ments, that is ‘information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular model’ (Svensson,
2005). It is thus natural to assume that assessments of the forecasts of other parties is fraught with errors.
See also Mankiw et al. (2003) for an empirical evidence on the existence of substantial disagreements
regarding expectations.
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where r is the real interest rate and v   Nð0; 2
vÞ is an i.i.d. demand shock that
captures preference shocks or exogenous changes in government expenditure. The
parameter   is an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and
5 satisfies  >0. Thus, the current period output gap depends on private sector
expectations of next period’s output gap, the real interest rate and the demand
shock.
Finally, the real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation, which links the
nominal interest rate with the real interest rate.
rt ¼ it   E
p
t tþ1 ð3Þ
10 where i is the nominal interest rate. Combining (2) and (3) one can rewrite the




txtþ1    it þ  E
p
t tþ1 þ vt ð4Þ
15 In each period the central bank optimizes after making an assessment of private
sector expectations. It sets it that minimizes the expected value of it’s period t loss
function given by
Lc
t ¼  2
t þ  x2
t ð5Þ
where   is the relative weight on output stabilization and superscript ‘c’ stands for
20 central bank.
We point out that our use of a purely forward-looking model is not critical for
our analysis and results. One may also use, for instance, a hybrid Phillips curve,
which includes lagged inflation.
4 However, it is easy to reformulate the central
bank’s policy problem under a hybrid Phillips curve into one with a purely for-
25 ward-looking Phillips curve by allowing for a utility-based loss function. Woodford
(2003) derives a hybrid Phillips curve, assuming that those firms which cannot reset
their prices in any given period, index them to a fraction   of lagged inflation
 t     t 1 ¼  ðEt tþ1     tÞþ xt þ ut
Woodford also derives a utility-based loss function associated with this hybrid
30 form. The loss function takes the form Lt ¼ð  t     t 1Þ
2 þ  x2
t. By defining
^  t ¼  t     t 1, the hybrid Phillips curve can be rewritten as
^  t ¼  Et ^  tþ1 þ  xt þ ut
with the loss function Lt ¼ ^  2
t þ  x2
t, which is comparable to the loss function (5).
Thus, the central bank’s policy problem remains the same as in the purely forward-
35 looking model.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4As is discussed in Paloviita (2006), recent estimates of various specifications of the Phillips curve show
support for a hybrid form of the Phillips curve, where both leads and lags matter for inflation dynamics.
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3. Equilibrium under full information
Before analysing optimal policy under asymmetric information, it is useful to con-
sider a simpler, baseline scenario where the central bank has full information about
the economy and observes private sector expectations without error. In this case,
5 even if it does not directly observe current inflation and output, the central bank
can infer them from private sector expectations, the prevailing interest rate, and the
two shocks.
Following much of the literature, the model is solved assuming that monetary
policy is conducted under discretion.
5 The optimality condition in terms of the





According to (6), in each period, the central bank contracts (expands) current
output in response to a higher (lower) rate of current inflation, with the degree
of response depending on the   and  . Combining the targeting rule with (1), (2),















  þ  2 ut þ vt
o
ð7Þ
The rate of interest responds optimally to private sector expectations and the two
shocks.Itisstraightforwardtoderivetherationalexpectationssolutionbysolvingfor
private sector expectations. Using (6) in (1) to substitute out xt, the rate of inflation
20 is give by
 t ¼
  




  þ  2 ut ð8Þ
Thus the dynamics of actual inflation depends on currently held private sector
expectations about next period’s inflation (which in turn depends on next period’s
cost-push shock ut+1) as well as on current period shock ut.
25 To solve for E
p
t tþ1 and derive the rational expectations equilibrium, note first
that the only relevant state variables are ut and the private sector’s forecast of ut+1.
To set the stage for the case with assessment errors, we assume the private sector has
full knowledge about ut+1. Using the commonly followed method of undetermined
coefficients,
6 first guess a solution of the form
 t ¼  1ut þ  2utþ1 ð9Þ
30 from which private sector rational expectations follow
E
p
t tþ1 ¼  1E
p
tutþ1 ¼  1utþ1 ð10Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5Clarida et al. (1999) argue that it is realistic to assume a discretionary monetary policy.
6McCallum (1983) emphasizes solving the model using only the fundamentals of the economy (in this
case ut and ut+1), thereby avoiding bubble solutions. McCallum calls this the Minimal State Variables
(MSV) method.
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Using this result back in (8) and imposing rational expectations
 t ¼    1ut þ    2utþ1 ð11Þ
where    1 ¼  
 þ 2 and    2 ¼     2
1.
5 To complete the rational expectations solution under full information, use (11)




ð   1ut þ    2utþ1Þð 12Þ
Thus under full information, equilibrium inflation and output are functions of
the cost-push shocks. Moreover, as long as some positive weight is attached to
10 stabilization of the output gap ( >0), the impact of the shocks are partially
absorbed by inflation and partially by output.
4. Assessment errors and disclosure
To this point the central bank was endowed with perfect knowledge of the state of
the economy and in particular regarding private sector expectations. A more realis-
15 tic setting, in the spirit of Tarkka and Mayes (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2003), among others, is that the central bank’s assessment of private sector expec-
tations about the future output gap and the future rate of inflation is imperfect.
Evans and Honkapohja (2003) discuss the issue of observability of current private
expectations in the context of the adaptive learning literature. They point out that
20 although survey data on private forecasts of future inflation and output are avail-
able to central banks, there are apparent concerns about the accuracy of this data.
Although most experts would agree that it is very hard for the central bank to
accurately measure the public’s expected output gap, opinions differ about the
extent to which the central bank is uncertain about inflationary expectations
25 (see, however, Mankiw et al., 2003).
Onemaychooseageneralsetup,wherethecentralbankmakesanassessmenterror
in both private sector inflationary expectations and output gap expectations (where
thevariancesoftheseerrorsmaybedifferent).However,asshowninAppendix2,our
qualitative results are not changed by focusing only on output gap expectations. To
30 captureasymmetricinformation,supposeprivatesectoroutputgapforecastsandthe




txtþ1   wx
t ð13Þ
where superscript c denotes central bank forecasts. Importantly, the assessment
errors follow a first-order autoregressive process
wx
t ¼  wx
t 1 þ  x
t ð14Þ
35 where the innovations are independently and normally distributed with
 x
t   Nð0; 2
 Þ and   is a measure for the degree of persistence of the assessment
errors, satisfying 0< <1. Assessment errors can be persistent if the central bank
only sluggishly adjusts its procedures.
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Also important for our analysis is that the central bank is uncertain about the
private sector’s own judgment regarding the development of the cost-push shock
ut+1.
7 The difference in the private sector’s and the central bank’s judgment regard-
ing ut+1 prevents the central bank from indirectly inferring, even in equilibrium, the
5 value of E
p
txtþ1.
Similar to the full information setting, monetary policy is discretionary but
now the central bank optimizes period by period based on its internal assessment
of private sector expectations. Moreover, to make the problem realistic and our
equilibrium non-revealing, we assume that the rate of inflation and the output gap
10 are not observable, even ex post (see e.g., McCallum (1999) for a criticism of models
that assume perfect observability of current inflation and output and Orphanides
(2003) for a discussion of monetary policy under data uncertainty. Orphanides
and van Norden (2002) show that ex post revisions of the estimated gap are as
large as the estimated gap itself and that these revisions are highly persistent.) With
15 these assumptions, the optimality condition is now written with the actual (ex post)








where central bank’s expectations of the Phillips equation is based on its assessment
20 of private sector inflationary expectations.
8 The central bank sets its policy rate,
it, optimally such that (15) is fulfilled.
Ec
t t ¼  Ec
t tþ1 þ  Ec
txt þ ut ð16Þ




  þ  2 Ec
t tþ1  
 
  þ  2 ut ð17Þ
25 Likewise, taking central bank’s expectation of the IS relation, (2)
Ec
txt ¼ Ec
txtþ1    it þ  Ec
t tþ1 þ vt ð18Þ








  þ  2
 
Ec
t tþ1 þ Ec
txtþ1 þ
 




7The importance of information asymmetry can be seen, for instance, from reports of the ECB survey of
professional forecasters. According to (Bowles et al., 2007, p.5) ‘information about such expectations
can, for example, provide evidence on the extent to which shocks affecting the inflation process are
perceived by agents as likely to persist or be more short-lived...’.
8We get the optimality condition (15) by minimizing the expected value of (4) subject to the central
bank’s expectation of the Phillips curve, which is eq. (16) below.
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It is easily seen that (19) has a similar form as its full information counterpart, (7).
The only difference lies in the expectational terms. Due to imperfect information
about private sector output expectations, the central bank uses its own (internal)
5 forecasts when setting the rate of interest. At the same time, unless disclosed by the
central bank, the private sector can not observe the central bank’s forecasts nor the
current assessment error. Ec
txtþ1 is only a noisy forecast of E
p
txtþ1, which means that
the central bank commits forecast errors and associated control errors. With (13) in











t tþ1 þð E
p
txtþ1   wx
tÞþ
 
  þ  2 ut þ vt
o
ð20Þ
10 so that the policy rate it is affected by the current assessment error, wx
t. The public
understands the structure of information asymmetry in the economy and so by
using (20) in (2), and the resulting equation in (1), it can infer that the actual
dynamics of output and inflation is a function of private sector expectations and
15 the assessment error.
xt ¼ 
  
  þ  2 E
p
t tþ1 þ wx
t  
 
  þ  2 ut ð21Þ
 t ¼
  
  þ  2 E
p
t tþ1 þ  wx
t þ
 
  þ  2 ut ð22Þ
An interesting feature of (21) and (22) is that both expressions are free of the term
20 E
p
txtþ1. The reduced form solutions are found by first solving for E
p
t tþ1 using (22).
Equation (22) differs from the full information counterpart, eq. (8), by the addi-
tional term  wx
t, which captures assessment errors reflecting our asymmetric
information setting.
5. Communication and expectations
25 In forecasting future inflation, the public uses its knowledge of past assessment
errors (in light of their persistent nature) and any information about current errors
that the central bank has disclosed.
9 We assume that the private sector gets a signal





30 where from (14) the assessment error is normally distributed with a given finite
variance, wx
t   Nð0; 2
wxÞ, and  2
wx ¼ 1
1  2  2
 x.
The degree of communication is measured by the quality of the central bank’s
disclosed information about its assessment of the public’s state of mind. With the
variance of the assessment errors,  2
wx, exogenously fixed, a fuzzy account of the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
9 A more general situation arises when past and present assessment errors are hidden variables so that
the private sector uses a more general form of Kalman filtering to get optimal forecasts.
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assessment errors by the central bank leads to large noise variance,  2
"x, since it
becomes difficult for the public to infer the unobservable assessment error from
disclosed information. Here the public depends completely on available central
bank models, procedures, and judgements that produce internal inflation forecasts
5 to make inferences about the assessment errors. In a more complicated scenario one
may allow the public to deduce or infer the central bank’s assessment errors from
observing the central bank’s interest rate decisions.
10
As in standard signal extraction problems, (23) represents an observation equa-
tion, where the input signal w
x is contaminated by an independent noise term e
x,
10 whose variance  2
"x is determined by the central bank’s disclosure policy. Since the
central bank controls the signal-to-noise ratio through its communication policy,
one can think of the central bank as determining the size of  2
"x according to
 2
"x ¼   2
 x where 0  <1 is a measure of the degree of transparency (see for
e.g. Faust and Svensson, 2001). If it opts for noiseless communication with the
15 public, the central bank sets t=0, while if the central bank chooses not to commu-
nicate at all, it sets   !1.
The public’s optimal predictor of wx
t can be solved using the Kalman filter, where
(14) is the transition equation and (23) is the observation equation. As wx
t 1 is in
the public’s information set, the steady state solution to the optimal predictor for
20 wx
t is (see for e.g Sargent, 1987, and Faust and Svensson, 2001)
wx
tjt   Epðwx
tjsx
t;wx
t 1Þ¼ð 1   KÞ wx
t 1 þ Ksx
t ð24Þ
where K   P
Pþ 2
"x is the Kalman gain (0 K 1). Here, P is the steady state value of
the conditional variance of the optimal predictor and is given by
P ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ  
ð1    2Þ 2









ð1    2Þ 2



















25 where we have used  2
"x ¼   2
 x and P is the limit of the conditional variance of the
predictor, Pt ¼ Epðwx
t   wx
tjtÞ
2, which is updated recursively according to




"x þ  2
 x. Then, K can be rewritten as
K ¼
2
1 þ  ð1    2Þþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4  þð 1    ð1    2ÞÞ
2 p ð26Þ
Note that there is a monotonic relationship between K and  . Thus, the optimal
30 choice of the degree of communication   can be analysed equivalently in terms
..........................................................................................................................................................................
10When the public is uncertain about central bank goals, (in addition to uncertainty about the assess-
ment errors), communication can play a different role. In this case Faust and Svensson (2001) define
transparency as ‘how easily the public can deduce central bank unobserved goals and intentions from
observables.’
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of the Kalman gain K. When there is no persistence in wx
t (i.e.,  =0), K ¼ 1
1þ  and




t, so that forecasts depend only on the current
period signal. In that case, Epðwx
tjsx
tÞ¼wx
t if   =0, while Epðwx
tjsx
tÞ¼0i f  !1.
Equation (24) says that in forming expectations about the current assessment error
5 of the central bank, the private sector takes a weighted average of its signal sx
t and a
forecast  wx
t 1 based on the AR(1) process. The weighting factor K in turn depends
on the degree of precision of central bank communication. Obviously when the
public receives no signal, (K=0), the best available forecast of wx
t is given by  wx
t 1.
6. Equilibrium with assessment errors
10 As before, we solve the model by applying the method of undetermined coefficients.
First, we conjecture that pt depends on the cost-push shocks, ut and ut+1, last period
assessment error, wx
t 1, and its innovation,  x
t, and the noise that is introduced by
the central bank’s communication policy, "x
t
 t ¼ B 2wx
t 1 þ B 4"x
t þ B 6 x
t þ B 7ut þ B 8utþ1 ð27Þ
15 Then from this follows private sector inflation expectations assuming knowledge of
the signal sx
t, the AR(1)-structure of wx




t tþ1 ¼ B 2wx
tjt þ B 7utþ1 ¼ B 2ðð1   KÞ wx
t 1 þ KstÞþB 7utþ1 ð28Þ
Essential here is that the public, using the signal of current period error and the
error’s autoregressive process, is able get an optimal forecast of the unobserved
20 assessment error. Next, substituting (28) in (22) and simplifying
 t ¼
 
  B 2




  KB 2




  KB 2





  þ  2 ut þ
  
  þ  2 B 7utþ1
ð29Þ
Consistency of rational expectations requires equalizing the coefficients of (29) with
those of (27).
  B 2 ¼
  ð  þ  2Þ
ð1     Þ  þ  2
  B 4 ¼
    K
ð1     Þ  þ  2   0
  B 6 ¼   þ
    K
ð1     Þ  þ  2   0
  B 7 ¼
 
  þ  2
  B 8 ¼     B2
 7
25 Note that with respect to communication the relevant coefficients   B 4 and   B 6 are
both nonnegative and directly proportional to K. Thus, inflation has more variabil-
ity with a higher degree of transparency.
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By using (28) in (21) (with   B ’s in mind) the equilibrium output process will be
xt ¼   Bx2wx
t 1 þ   Bx4"x
t þ   Bx6 x
t þ   Bx7ut þ   Bx8utþ1 ð30Þ
where
  Bx2 ¼
 ð  þ  2Þ
  þ  2ð1     Þ
 1
  Bx4 ¼ 
   2K
ð1     Þ  þ  2   0
  Bx6 ¼ 1  
   2K
ð1     Þ  þ  2   0
  Bx7 ¼ 
 
  þ  2





5 Equation (30) makes it clear that output, like inflation, responds positively to
current innovations to the assessment error  x
t but, unlike inflation, it responds
negatively to the current observation noise "x
t. Note also that   B 7,   B 8,   Bx7 and   Bx8
are not functions of K. In our model, as the communication policy is about
assessment errors, it does not influence the effect of the cost-push shocks on
10 inflation and output.
Next, using the reduced forms of (29) and (30), we can show the effect of
changing K (the degree of transparency) on the variability of inflation and output.
 2
  ¼
    B2
 2
1    2 þ
ð1   KÞ   B2
 4
Kð1  ð 1   KÞ 2Þ




 x þð  B2





    B2
x2
1    2 þ
ð1   KÞ   B2
x4
Kð1  ð 1   KÞ 2Þ




 x þð  B2
x7 þ   B2
x8Þ 2
u ð32Þ





1    2
 2
"x ¼   2
 x
¼
1   K
Kð1  ð 1   KÞ 2Þ
 2
 x
from (23) and (26), respectively.
It is not difficult to show that increasing the value of K unambiguously raises
20 the variability of inflation while it reduces the variability of the output gap.
11
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11From (31) and (32) the partial derivatives of the coefficients of  2
 x with respect to K are positive and
negative, respectively.
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Thus increasing K (higher degree of transparency) improves the performance of
output at the expense of inflation, and vice versa.
Equation (28) shows that, in equilibrium E
p
t tþ1 responds positively to changes
in wx
t, and this response is stronger the larger is K, at least within the admissible
5 values of K and  . It follows from (21) that E
p
t tþ1 offsets the effect of the assess-
ment error wx
t on xt. Thus, E
p
t tþ1 can play a stabilizing role with respect to wx
t.




t  tþ1 ¼   B2
 2ð 2 2
wx þ K2ð 2
 x þ  2










K2ð1   KÞ





















7. When does society benefit from central bank
communication?
In order to analyse the effect of communication by the central bank about the
assessment errors, we allow for the possibility that the society differs from the
15 central banker in the way it weighs the relative benefits from inflation and
output stabilization. To formalize this
Ls
t ¼  2
t þ  sx2
t ð34Þ
where  s represents society’s concern about output stabilization relative to infla-
tion. Taking unconditional expectation of the loss function
EðLs
tÞ¼ 2
  þ  s 2
x ð35Þ
20 In what follows we analyse the optimal choice of central bank conservatism given  s
and how this choice is related to communication policy.
12 As we show below, it
turns out that given society’s preference for output stabilization  s, it is optimal for
society to appoint a conservative central banker ( <  s). Moreover, if this central
25 banker is sufficiently conservative, communication makes the society better off. We
first analyse optimal conservatism and then analyse optimal communication.
Proposition 1 Given society’s preferences and the structure of the economy, it is
always optimal for society to select a central banker who is conservative in the sense
30 that she puts less weight on output stabilization than society ( <  s).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12See Hughes Hallett and Libich (2007) for a discussion of transparency vs. goal-independence in
monetary policy.
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Proof Evaluate the first-order condition of society’s loss function with respect to
the weight attached to output stabilization   at the point where  = s. This expres-
sion is positive if K=0 and increasing in K for 0 K 1. Therefore, for every
admissible value of K, society’s welfare is improved by selecting a conservative
5 central banker. «
This proposition tells us that, optimally, we will be in a situation where the
central bank decides on interest rate policy based on its own weight on output
stabilization while the society assigns a higher weight on output stabilization. The
central bank is then weight-conservative, as in Rogoff (1985). More specifically, the
10 first order condition for optimal central bank preferences can be thought of as
being of the following shape






where hð  Þ¼ ð   2ð1 þ 2 2Þþ2   2 þ  4Þ=ð  2ð1 þ  2Þþ  ð2    2Þ 2 þ  4Þ
  
> 1,  2
u > 0 and g( s,   , K)>0.
15 So, in absence of shocks to the assessment error ( 2
 x ¼ 0), it is optimal to choose
   such that    ¼  s
hð  Þ <  s. This result is due to the information structure about
future shocks ut+1, which affect private sector inflation expectations and in turn
current inflation and the output gap. It turns out that the effect on inflation is more
pronounced than the effect on the output gap. A more conservative central bank
20 (but not too conservative) helps stabilize inflation, at a smaller cost in terms of
higher output volatility. When innovations to the assessment errors have a positive
variance, a lower value of    will have to be chosen, for a given  s.
Proposition 2 A higher variance of assessment errors makes the optimal central
25 bank more conservative, while a higher variance of the cost-push shock makes the
optimal central bank less conservative.
Proof @EðLs
tÞ=@  is increasing in  2
 x and decreasing in  2
u. To see this
@EðLs
tÞ=@  ¼ F1
  2
 x þ F2
  2
u þ  sðF3
  2
 x þ F4
  2




  > 0; and F4
  < 0 are the derivatives of the coefficients of  2
 x and  2
u
30 with respect to  . Therefore, given  s, a  should decrease with  2
 x and increase
with  2
u. «
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal level of communication, K.
The coefficient of  2
 x in (31) monotonically increases with K while that in (32)
monotonically decreases with K. This implies that more communication increases
35 the variability of inflation and reduces the variability of output. Which of these two
opposing effects dominates, can be checked by analysing society’s loss function.
Analysis of the first and second order conditions of society’s loss with respect to
communication parameter K reveals that there can never be a situation where
we only have to consider interior solutions. Either K=0orK=1 (possibly both)
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is always at least a local optimum. In Appendix 1 we also derive conditions under
which it is possible, in principle, to have an interior optimum. We thus consider the
extreme (but probably optimal) cases of no communication K=0 and full commu-
nication K=1.
5 For this case, take the difference
EðLs
tÞjK¼1   EðLs
tÞjK¼0 ¼
   2
ðð1     Þ  þ  2Þ
2 Q 2
 x ð37Þ
where Q=2(   s)( + 
2)   ( 
2  s(2 + 
2)). Note that K does not affect the
coefficients of  2
u in the variances of inflation (31) and output gap (32). Therefore,
the term containing  2
u vanishes from (37). Given the structural parameters of the
10 economy, the sign of the right hand side of (37) depends on the sign of Q, that in
turn depends on the value of   relative  s. For example if the central banker shares
the same preferences as society ( s= ) we have Q=   ( + 
2)>0, so that com-
munication is welfare decreasing. It is then clear that when society has a central
banker who shares the society’s loss function (i.e. the central banker is neither
15 conservative nor liberal compared to society), publication of central bank assess-
ments actually makes the society worse-off. This result also shows that if left to her
own decision (in other words, if she is independent regarding disclosure policy) the
central banker would prefer not to reveal her assessments.
Thus in our setup there arises a situation where communication may not be
20 desired by a central banker but may benefit the society. Proposition 3 below
summarizes the result.
Proposition 3 Communication about the central bank’s assessment error of output
expectations improves society’s welfare if the central bank is sufficiently conser-




2 2 þ  ð2     Þ
 2ð2     Þþ ð2   2  Þ
> 1
Proof From (37) Q<0 if and only if  s=  > ð2 2 þ  ð2     ÞÞ=ð 2ð2     Þþ
 ð2   2  ÞÞ. «
Since the term on the right hand side of the inequality sign is greater than one,
30 the proposition says that for the society to benefit from transparency, it must have
appointed a central banker who is sufficiently conservative. The positive effect of
communication on stabilization of the output gap is stronger when the central
banker is more conservative (the smaller is  ). On the other hand stabilization
of the output gap contributes more to social welfare if society puts more weight on
35 output gap stabilization (the larger is  s). Thus, what matters is the ratio of  s to  ;
society benefits more from communication the higher the degree of conservatism
of the central banker.
Take for instance a positive assessment error in period t. That means the central
bank underestimates the expected level of next period’s output gap. The policy it
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has planned is therefore too loose and the interest rate it plans to set too low
(see equation (20)). If the public is aware of the fact that the procedure used by
the central bank leads to an underestimation of the expected output gap (i.e. this
error is communicated) the public will expect this error to persist in the future
5 (this follows from eq. (28)), increasing inflation expectations. Equation (21) makes
it clear that under communication inflation expectations play a stabilizing role vis-
a-vis the assessment error (see also eq. (33)). The instrument rule (20) is only
indirectly affected by communication, as the interest rate simply responds to
changes in private sector expectations.
10 8. Concluding remarks
It is sometimes argued that central banks need to be secretive in order to maintain
flexibility, which enables them to stabilize the economy. We find that this explan-
ation does not carry through in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework,
where transparency about the central bank’s forecasting procedures improves
15 output stabilization. By communicating and being transparent about its procedures
that may lead to assessment errors of private sector expectations, the central bank
is better able to stabilize the output gap than when its assessment errors come as
a surprise to the public. The reason is that under communication inflation expecta-
tions move in the direction that helps to stabilize the impact of the errors on the
20 output gap. The inflation rate, however, becomes more volatile, as inflation expec-
tations amplify the impact of the assessment errors on inflation.
A crucial element in our analysis is that, with communication by the central
bank, the public is able to forecast the error that the central bank will make in
assessing private sector expectations. In our welfare analysis we showed that a
25 sufficiently conservative central bank improves society’s welfare by communicating
its assessment of private sector expectations.
Furthermore, we analyse the relationship between communication and central
bank conservatism. We find that a transparent central bank can afford to be more
conservative, as the benefits from higher transparency in terms of output stabiliza-
30 tion are greater the more conservative is the central bank.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2) is available online at the
OEP website.
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